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When receiving webhooks, the signing operation has already been performed by the platform and you must validate the signature we provide to ensure the webhook originated from us.

When creating a subscription (using the subscription API), you are provided a signature_verification_key. This value is a base64‑encoded symmetric secret used to compute an HMAC-SHA256 signature for each webhook payload. You must persist this secret securely at subscription creation time.

NOTE: The returned signature_verification_key is base64-encoded binary. In the code sample below we base64‑decode it to raw bytes (you do NOT re‑encode it). You may display it in hex for debugging, but hex is not required for verification.

When a webhook is dispatched:

  • We include X-Webhook-Timestamp (epoch milliseconds).

  • We include X-Webhook-Signature in the form: t=<timestamp>,v1=<hex_hmac_sha256>.

  • You reconstruct the exact signing string and verify.

Verification is a 2 step process:

StepActionDescription
1ReconstructConcatenate the timestamp, a dot (.), and the SHA256 hex digest of the raw request body: <timestamp>.<sha256(body)>
2VerifyHMAC-SHA256 the signing string with the decoded secret; compare the resulting hex digest to v1 (constant-time).

Fields Used in the Signature

FieldDescription
TimestampRaw value from X-Webhook-Timestamp (epoch millis as a string).
BodyThe exact raw HTTP request body bytes (no parsing / reformatting).
body_hashSHA256 hex digest of the raw body.
signing_string<timestamp>.<body_hash>
SecretBase64-decoded signature_verification_key.
SignatureHex digest of HMAC_SHA256(secret, signing_string) placed in v1.

If any of these values are transformed (e.g. JSON pretty-printed, numeric formatting changed, timestamp altered) the verification will fail.

Verification Example

import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import time
from typing import Optional

def verify_webhook(raw_body: bytes,
                   timestamp: str,
                   signature_header: str,
                   base64_secret: str,
                   max_age_seconds: int = 300) -> bool:
    """
    Verify an incoming webhook.

    Parameters:
      raw_body:        Exact raw request body bytes (no mutation).
      timestamp:       X-Webhook-Timestamp header (epoch millis as string).
      signature_header:X-Webhook-Signature header in form "t=<timestamp>,v1=<hex>".
      base64_secret:   subscription signature_verification_key (base64).
      max_age_seconds: Allowed clock skew / replay window (0 disables freshness check).

    Returns:
      True if signature is valid, else False.
    """
    if not (raw_body and timestamp and signature_header and base64_secret):
        return False

    # Parse signature header
    parts = {}
    try:
        for seg in signature_header.split(","):
            k, v = seg.split("=", 1)
            parts[k.strip()] = v.strip()
    except Exception:
        return False

    if parts.get("t") != timestamp or "v1" not in parts:
        return False

    # Freshness (optional)
    if max_age_seconds > 0 and timestamp.isdigit():
        try:
            ts_int = int(timestamp)
            # Detect millis
            if ts_int > 1_000_000_000_000:
                ts_int //= 1000
            if abs(int(time.time()) - ts_int) > max_age_seconds:
                return False
        except ValueError:
            return False

    # SHA256 hex of body
    body_hash = hashlib.sha256(raw_body).hexdigest()
    signing_string = f"{timestamp}.{body_hash}".encode("utf-8")

    # Decode secret (single base64 decode only)
    try:
        secret = base64.b64decode(base64_secret, validate=True)
    except Exception:
        return False

    expected = hmac.new(secret, signing_string, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
    provided = parts["v1"]
    # Constant-time compare
    return hmac.compare_digest(expected, provided)

Flask Usage Example

from flask import Flask, request, Response
import os

from verifier import verify_webhook  # assuming the function above saved as verifier.py

app = Flask(__name__)
SECRET = os.environ.get("WEBHOOK_SECRET_VERIFICATION_KEY")  # set from secure config

@app.post("/webhook")
def webhook():
    raw_body = request.get_data()  # exact bytes
    ts = request.headers.get("X-Webhook-Timestamp", "")
    sig = request.headers.get("X-Webhook-Signature", "")
    if not verify_webhook(raw_body, ts, sig, SECRET, max_age_seconds=300):
        return Response("invalid signature", status=400)
    # Safe to parse AFTER verification
    return Response("ok", status=200)

Key Points

  • Always read raw bytes first; only parse JSON after verification.

  • Do not pretty-print or modify the JSON before hashing.

  • Reject if age window exceeded or headers malformed.

  • Use hmac.compare_digest for constant-time comparison.

Common Pitfalls

IssueCauseResolution
signature_mismatchSecret double-base64 encodedUse original subscription value directly
signature_mismatchBody re-serialized / pretty-printedHash exact raw bytes
signature_mismatchTimestamp mismatch between t and headerEnsure they match verbatim
Stale timestampClock skew or delayed processingCheck system clock; adjust max age
Invalid header formatMissing t= or v1= segmentEnsure exact format t=...,v1=...

Checklist

  • [ ] Captured raw body (not parsed then re-stringified)

  • [ ] Extracted X-Webhook-Timestamp

  • [ ] Parsed X-Webhook-Signature → t & v1

  • [ ] Computed SHA256 hex of raw body

  • [ ] Built signing string <timestamp>.<body_hash>

  • [ ] Base64-decoded stored secret

  • [ ] HMAC-SHA256 computed & constant-time compared

  • [ ] (Optional) Freshness window passed

If every box is checked and comparison succeeds, the webhook is authentic.