Every API request requires a JWT token for session auth. State-changing operations additionally require a digital signature.
- JWT tokens are obtained by signing a challenge with your private key.
- Tokens expire after 4 hours by default. Generate a new one when needed.
- Intents require an additional signature over the intent payload itself.
- Each challenge can only be used once to prevent replay attacks.
Understanding this two-layer model is essential for API integrations. Read-only operations only need a valid JWT, but any action that modifies state (transfers, policy changes, user management) requires a cryptographic signature that creates a non-repudiable audit record. Your integration code must handle both layers correctly.
For architects and operators: Implement proper key management in your integration code—never hardcode private keys. Use environment variables, secrets managers, or HSM integrations. Plan for token refresh in long-running processes.
Before authenticating API requests, you must complete:
- Generate keys and register - Your key pair and user account must be set up
You also need:
- Your private key (generated during registration)
- Your public key (in DER format with Base64 encoding)
- The authorization server URL (contact your administrator)
- Your client ID (provided by your administrator)
All API requests require a JWT (JSON Web Token) passed as a Bearer token in the Authorization header. You need to obtain a JWT when you first start using the API and whenever your token expires.
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Default expiration | 4 hours |
| Token type | Bearer |
| Issuer | Ripple OIDC server (default) |
| Auth server URL | https://openid.{environment_URL}/token (contact your administrator) |
- You generate a random challenge string.
- You sign the challenge with your private key.
- You submit the public key, challenge, and signature to the auth server.
- The server verifies your signature and issues a JWT.
For security reasons, you can only use a challenge once. For every new authentication request, you must generate a new challenge and create a new signature.
Create a random string (such as a UUID) and sign it with your private key.
# Create a random challenge (use -n to prevent trailing newline)
echo -n "$(uuidgen)" > challenge.txt
# Sign the challenge
openssl dgst -sha256 -sign privateKey.pem challenge.txt | base64Submit your credentials to the authorization server:
POST https://openid.{environment_URL}/token
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=password
&client_id=YOUR_CLIENT_ID
&signature=<base64_encoded_signature>
&challenge=<challenge_string>
&public_key=<base64_encoded_public_key>The server returns a JWT:
{
"access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": 14400
}The expires_in value is in seconds (14400 = 4 hours).
Include the JWT in the Authorization header of all API requests:
GET /v1/domains
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...All state-changing operations require a digital signature in addition to the JWT. These operations are called "intents" and include:
- Creating entities (users, accounts, domains)
- Updating entities
- Approving or rejecting intents
- Creating transactions
The signature both proves that you explicitly authorized the specific action, and creates an immutable audit trail.
Prepare the request object: Build the
requestobject containing author, expiry, target domain, and payload (see Intent request structure below)Canonicalize: Convert the
requestobject to canonical JSON format (see Canonicalization rules below)Sign: Hash the canonical JSON with SHA-256 and sign with your private key
Encode the signature: Serialize the signature in DER format with Base64 encoding
Add to request body: Include the signature in the
signaturefield of the request body (not a header)
All intents follow this structure. The signature is computed over the canonicalized request object only:
{
"request": {
"author": {
"id": "<your-user-uuid>",
"domainId": "<your-domain-uuid>"
},
"expiryAt": "2026-02-25T12:00:00.000Z",
"targetDomainId": "<target-domain-uuid>",
"id": "<new-intent-uuid>",
"customProperties": {},
"payload": {
"type": "v0_CreatePolicy",
"...": "payload-specific fields"
},
"description": "Human-readable description",
"type": "Propose"
},
"signature": "<base64-signature-of-canonicalized-request-object>"
}The customProperties field is mandatory at the request level. Use an empty object {} if you have no custom properties. Missing this field causes a validation error.
Canonical JSON ensures that identical data always produces identical signatures, regardless of how the JSON was originally formatted. The rules are:
| Rule | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Remove whitespace | No spaces, tabs, or newlines | {"a":"b"} not { "a": "b" } |
| Sort keys alphabetically | All object keys sorted A-Z, recursively through nested objects | {"a":1,"b":2} not {"b":2,"a":1} |
| Omit null values | Do not include fields with null values in your JSON | {"a":1} not {"a":1,"b":null} |
| Preserve array order | Arrays of objects keep their original order—do not sort array elements | [{"z":1},{"a":2}] stays as-is |
| No trailing newline | The canonicalized output must not end with a newline character | Use jq -j flag |
Do not include fields with null values in your JSON. The server removes null values during canonicalization, so if your JSON contains "field": null, your canonicalized version will differ from the server's, causing InvalidSignatureError.
Wrong: {"intentTypes": null, "customProperties": {}}
Correct: {"customProperties": {}} (omit the null field entirely)
Example transformation:
Original JSON:
{
"type": "v0_CreateTransactionOrder",
"note": null,
"details": {
"amount": "100",
"asset": "USD"
}
}Canonical JSON:
{"details":{"amount":"100","asset":"USD"},"type":"v0_CreateTransactionOrder"}Use jq to canonicalize the JSON before signing:
cat intent.json | jq -j -S -c > intent_sorted.jsonjq flags explained:
-S— Sort object keys alphabetically-c— Compact output (removes whitespace)-j— No trailing newline (critical—a newline changes the hash)
The -j flag is essential. Without it, jq adds a trailing newline that becomes part of the hashed content, causing signature verification to fail.
# Canonicalize the JSON payload
cat intent.json | jq -j -S -c > intent_sorted.json
# Sign the sorted payload
openssl dgst -sha256 -sign privateKey.pem intent_sorted.json | base64 -b0This example shows the full flow for submitting a signed intent to create a policy.
1. Create the request object (request.json):
{
"author": {
"id": "461dac3d-55c6-4ce8-9ce2-dfb97cfbe279",
"domainId": "67241e7d-f345-459e-9293-475693c45d85"
},
"expiryAt": "2026-02-25T12:00:00.000Z",
"targetDomainId": "67241e7d-f345-459e-9293-475693c45d85",
"id": "aaaaaaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaaaaaaaaaa",
"customProperties": {},
"payload": {
"id": "bbbbbbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbbbbbbbbbb",
"alias": "Daily Operations Policy",
"rank": 100,
"intentTypes": ["v0_CreateTransferOrder"],
"scope": "Self",
"scriptingEngine": "Javascript_v0",
"condition": {
"expression": "true",
"type": "Expression"
},
"workflow": [{"role": "admin", "quorum": 1, "type": "RoleQuorum"}],
"lock": "Unlocked",
"customProperties": {},
"type": "v0_CreatePolicy"
},
"description": "Create a policy for daily operations",
"type": "Propose"
}2. Canonicalize and sign:
# Canonicalize (sort keys, compact, no trailing newline)
cat request.json | jq -j -S -c > request_canonical.json
# Sign (P-256/secp256k1 on macOS)
SIGNATURE=$(openssl dgst -sha256 -sign privateKey.pem request_canonical.json | base64 | tr -d '\n')3. Build and submit the full request:
# Build the full request body with signature
REQUEST=$(cat request.json)
cat > intent_body.json << EOF
{
"request": $REQUEST,
"signature": "$SIGNATURE"
}
EOF
# Submit to the API
curl -X POST "https://api.example.com/v1/intents" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d @intent_body.jsonExpected response:
{
"requestId": "8737c2a2-e8e1-46bf-a2a4-9918437f4a29"
}The signature is computed from the canonicalized request object. The server canonicalizes your request and verifies the signature matches. Any difference in canonicalization (including null values or trailing newlines) will cause signature verification to fail.
Approving an intent uses a different request structure than proposing. For complete details on the approval workflow, see Approve and reject intents.
| Field | Proposal | Approval |
|---|---|---|
id | Required (new intent UUID) | Not used |
intentId | Not used | Required (existing intent UUID) |
payload | Required (the operation details) | Not used |
proposalSignature | Not used | Required (from original proposal) |
expiryAt | Required | Required |
type | "Propose" | "Approve" |
Example approval request:
{
"request": {
"author": {
"id": "828b554c-c9c9-11eb-a79b-dcfb48cfb3cb",
"domainId": "455ad43e-cdd9-11eb-8465-dcfb48cfb3cb"
},
"targetDomainId": "455ad43e-cdd9-11eb-8465-dcfb48cfb3cb",
"expiryAt": "2026-02-26T12:00:00.000Z",
"intentId": "846b5c3c-27e3-4146-ab18-ce6732624d35",
"proposalSignature": "<signature-from-original-proposal>",
"approvalReason": "Approved after review",
"type": "Approve"
},
"signature": "<base64-signature-of-canonicalized-request-object>"
}The proposalSignature is retrieved from the original intent's data.details.proposalSignature field.
The JWT token identifies the API caller. When submitting an intent (proposal or approval), the author.id in the request must correspond to the user identified by the JWT.
You cannot use one user's JWT to submit intents on behalf of another user. This is enforced at the API layer.
The two-layer authentication model enforces:
- JWT identifies the caller — The server extracts user identity from the JWT token
- Signature proves authorization — The digital signature proves the author explicitly authorized the action
- Both must be consistent — The JWT user and the intent author must be the same person
This prevents delegation attacks where a compromised JWT could be used to forge actions for other users.
| Error | Cause | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
InvalidJwtError | JWT token is expired or malformed | Obtain a new JWT token |
InvalidSignatureError | Signature doesn't match the payload | Verify payload is properly canonicalized (sorted, no whitespace, no nulls) |
InvalidSignatureError | Wrong private key used | Ensure you're signing with the private key that matches your registered public key |
InvalidSignatureError | Trailing newline in challenge | Use echo -n when creating the challenge to prevent trailing newlines |
PermissionDeniedError | JWT user doesn't match intent author | Ensure the JWT token belongs to the user specified in author.id |
PermissionDeniedError | User lacks permission for the operation | Check your user roles and domain permissions with your administrator |
PermissionDeniedError | User not in domain's readAccess | Ensure your roles are included in the domain's readAccess permissions |
InvalidIntentError: This user has already signed | Proposer attempting to approve own intent | A different user must approve; proposers cannot self-approve (dual control) |
| 401 Unauthorized | Missing or invalid Authorization header | Ensure the JWT is included as Bearer <token> |
- Authentication - Conceptual overview of authentication in Ripple Custody
- Generate keys and register - One-time setup for new users
- Approve and reject intents - Complete approval workflow
- Verifying Custody signatures - How to verify signatures on data returned by the platform